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ABSTRACT
The literature on financial regulation has typically emphasized the role of
the powerful financial industry in shaping regulatory outcomes. However,
capture theories cannot explain the prominence of financial consumer
protection in post-crisis reform agendas. By contrast, this article argues
that, despite their collective action disadvantage, a polymorphous network
of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after the financial
crisis and to influence the financial reform process. In this policy window,
where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of
expertise, a transnationally connected civil society (TCS) network
successfully mobilized to place consumer protection on reform agendas in
tandem with public entrepreneurs and on the back of a popular backlash
against big finance. This argument will be explored through a comparative
study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe
and the US in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In the conclusion, the
article shortly discusses the substance of the financial reforms that have
been undertaken.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the influence of non-state actors on international
finance, scholarly attention has focused on the role the powerful financial
industry has played in international regulatory politics. Maintaining
‘symbiotic relations’ with regulatory agencies, the financial industry has
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been able to influence the nature of financial governance and has the
potential to capture regulatory processes (Underhill and Zhang, 2003:
84). Analyses of the recent crisis have seemingly comforted this conven-
tional wisdom. According to many observers, national and international
financial reform efforts after the crisis were considerably watered down
or scaled back by transnational private-sector lobbies (Johnson and
Kwak, 2010; Engelen et al., 2010; Woolley and Ziegler, 2011). However,
this capture narrative misses an important aspect of current regulatory
dynamics. By declaring continued private financial sector dominance in
financial regulatory developments, these explanations cannot account for
structural changes in the regulatory architecture in response to the crisis.
In particular, scholars focusing solely on the role of the financial industry
cannot explain why consumer protection has moved from the periphery
to the centre of political debates about reforms of the financial regulatory
system in Europe and the United States in the aftermath of the most
severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. What explains the pop-
ularity of consumer protection in financial regulatory reforms that have
been enacted in response to the global financial crisis of 2007?
Consumer protection is one of the main domains treated in the ‘Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’ (short: Dodd-Frank) signed
into law by President Barack Obama on 21 July 2010. For the first time in
the history of American finance, this legislation established a Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent federal agency to
protect consumers from abusive financial practices. Similarly, under the
banner of ‘restoring consumer confidence in financial markets’, the Euro-
pean Commission has brought forward a policy that includes legislative
proposals on basic banking services, stronger deposit guarantees and
investor protection as well as on stricter regulations of complex retail
investment products and responsible lending. Among other issues, con-
sumer protection is also a remit of the new European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs). Establishing a first international standard in the field
of financial consumer protection, the G20 finance ministers and Central
Bank governors endorsed ‘high-level principles’ in October 2011. Com-
plementing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) principles, civil society groups and other international
organizations launched various additional international initiatives,
including the World Bank’s ‘Good Practices’, (The World Bank, 2012).
Concerning retail financial services in the European Union (EU), leading
financial service providers talk about a ‘conspicuous’ shift in regulatory
focus ‘from internal market integration towards more consumer protec-
tion issues’ (Ahlswede, 2011: 9).
This prominence of consumer-protection in the international financial
reform agenda is somewhat surprising given that the strong and well-
organized financial lobby has traditionally prevailed over weaker and
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less well-organized consumer organizations. Caught in a classic collec-
tive action dilemma (Olson, 1965), consumer groups are struggling to
organize their members in order to influence politics. When we look at
past developments in financial regulation, Olson’s reasoning has held
true: concentrated costs and more political leverage for the tightly orga-
nized financial industry have generally led to more industry-friendly
than consumer friendly-policies. People’s protests against deregulatory
measures had little to no effect (Kroszner et al., 2011). And yet, dynamics
are changing. With taxpayers’ money used for expensive bank bailouts,
financial regulatory issues became politicized and attracted the public
interest in a way that was most unusual for this highly technical and
complex issue area. In a reaction to the subprime crisis in 2007, much
public anger arose about the perceived unfairness of the international
financial system – famously described as a system that privatized gains
and socialized losses. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ protests occurred in numer-
ous cities in the US and Europe, directed against financial elites held
responsible for the devastating social consequences the financial melt-
down had triggered. In an attempt to channel the outburst of public
anger, numerous civil society organizations, such as consumer non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), unions and grass-roots groups started
to build transnational alliances to influence the reform negotiations. Even
though they were pitched against the fierce opposition of the financial
industry, new coalitions ‘for financial reform’ mushroomed. This article
argues that the transnational efforts of civil society groups account for
the sudden popularity of more consumer-friendly regulations on interna-
tional financial reform agendas. By way of illustration, the increase in
salience is visible by simply tracing the use of the term ‘consumer finan-
cial regulation’ in the financial press (Figure 1).
Figure 1 Number of Articles mentioning ‘consumer financial protection’ in
The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. Source: Factiva.
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The mechanism identified here suggests that public outrage increased
consumer groups’ and NGOs’ ability to contribute to the regulatory pro-
cess and raise consumer concerns. The crisis as focusing event shifted the
political mood and opened up a political opportunity structure in terms
of institutional access as well as political receptivity. With the financial
sector’s reputation for expertise heavily damaged, decision-makers were
looking out for an alternative source of expertise. Moreover, the organi-
zation as a transnational network provided sufficient resources and
allowed civil society to channel widespread public support, to call upon
well-positioned public entrepreneurs. Baldly stated, consumer concerns
became popular on reform agendas because of the influence of an alliance
of publicly elected officials and civil society groups which gained momen-
tum on the back of a popular backlash against big finance – despite their
collective action disadvantage. This argument will be explored through a
comparative study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-
makers in Europe and the US in the immediate aftermath of the financial
crisis. The article will focus on activities by which non-governmental
actors seek to influence the agenda-setting process rather than the ways in
which they mobilize their members. The similarity of reform dynamics
will be traced on the basis of policy documents, public statements and
90 semi-structured interviews with leading actors in the politics of finan-
cial market reforms in the countries studied conducted between July 2011
and July 2013. The findings suggest that TCS successfully influenced the
agenda setting, the implementation phase however, turned out to be
largely dominated by industry lobbying. On the whole, consumer protec-
tion reforms do not mark a new regulatory paradigm.
There is a growing consensus in the literature that internationally orga-
nized NGOs or non-profit transnational actors make a difference in
world politics (Finnemore, 1996; Batliwala and Brown, 2006). Social sci-
entific scholarship demonstrates, for example, that civil society groups
acting across borders had an impact on global policy decisions in the field
of human rights, environmental protection and security policy as well as
economic transactions, thereby underlining their status as major actors in
international affairs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Price, 1998; Florini, 2000).
Yet, for all the scholarly attention paid to these transnational acting
groups, the conditions under which civil society can impact financial reg-
ulation remain poorly understood. Friesen (2012: 3) notes that ‘although
much has been written on both international finance and transnational
social movements, little has been written on how these two bodies of lit-
erature might be connected.’ This study addresses this gap by investigat-
ing the process by which TCS seeks to influence international financial
regulation in order to provide ‘more detailed knowledge of how the
mobilization of these groups beyond the financial industry can influence
the direction of state policy’ (Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011: 179).
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First the article outlines potential answers to the question of financial
regulatory change as suggested by the literatures on organized interests,
transnational expert networks and electoral politics. Second, it develops
a different analytical lens that stresses the role of a TCS network in
channelling public attention and support for reform as main explanatory
factor. Next, it sketches the empirical pattern of EU and US regulatory
reform agendas with a special focus on civil society groupings and their
various strategies which aimed at raising the profile of financial con-
sumer protection. Following Keck and Sikkink (1998), the article will
illustrate various TCS tactics to demonstrate their impact on regulatory
reform. It will explore how civil society formed transnational networks,
called upon and lobbied powerful political allies, reframed the issues,
transformed the discourse and shifted the reform agenda. The article con-
cludes by evaluating the contrasting results of the case studies.
1. EXPLAINING REGULATORY CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
Analyses about financial regulatory outcomes tend to emphasize private
capture explanations of policy-making. However, these theories in the
study of regulatory change have difficulty accounting for the prominence
of consumer protection measures in financial reform agendas. After the
financial crisis, policy-makers markedly stepped up their rhetoric on con-
sumer protection in financial services. At the signing ceremony of the
Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama (2010) called the reforms ‘the stron-
gest consumer financial protections in history.’ The European Commis-
sioner for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier (2010), called for
‘consumer protection across the board’. And the G20 leaders included a
call to enhance consumer protection in their common declaration of the
Seoul Summit (G20 Declaration, 2010). This rhetoric is all the more sur-
prising, since past research has shown that private financial sector partic-
ipation in setting and implementing rules tends to put consumers at a
disadvantage (Frangakis, 2009). This article argues that focusing on the
role of a TCS network, helps us understand the post-crisis regulatory
framework and in particular, the rise of consumer protection.
Organized interests
One set of explanations for regulatory outcomes in a domestic politics
tradition has focused on societal actors with a vested interest in financial
regulatory affairs. Past literature has shown the increasing involvement
of the private financial sector in national decision-making. Some scholars
pinpoint the risk of capture due to the disproportionate influence of the
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domestic private financial sector in shaping regulatory policies and its
ability to fully internalize its preferences in the policy process (Hacker
and Pierson, 2010; Johnson and Kwak, 2010). As a result, regulatory out-
comes traditionally favoured ‘the narrow ‘few’ at the expense of society
as a whole’ (Mattli and Woods, 2009), and bodies governing international
finance have become ‘instruments of private economic interests rather
than of the public good’ (Underhill and Zhang, 2003: 86). Accordingly,
Hacker and Pierson (2010) explain striking income inequalities among
Americans in terms of the organizational capacity of resourceful private
interests to bring public policy in line with their interests. This pattern
has been most pronounced in the field of finance, they argue, where the
massive political leverage of financial industry lobbyists accounts for
overly industry-friendly regulatory politics. Frangakis (2009: 102) draws
a similar picture regarding European financial services policy, which is
‘heavily oriented towards serving the interest of [. . .] the financial
industry’.’
From this perspective, where regulatory change depends upon the
means and the power of the financial industry lobby to (re-)shape regula-
tory reform, we would expect the outcome to reflect domestic financial
sector preferences. Instead, in the wake of the crisis, various scholars have
stressed the industry’s relative resilience to reform (Johnson and Kwak,
2010; Engelen et al., 2011). While the banking industry stated that it
supports ‘regulatory reform to improve consumer protection’ (Yingling,
2009), industry lobbyists were particularly opposed to the creation of a
US consumer protection bureau. Similarly, in the EU, financial industry
lobbyists tried to defend the status quo rather than push for reform. An
exception are efforts by UK and Dutch retail banks who wanted to see
their stricter national consumer protection rules exported to Europe for
level-playing field reasons.1 Hence, for our case studies, the organized
interests’ perspective falls somewhat short of explaining sudden change.
Transnational networks of experts
Drawing on the ‘epistemic communities’ literature, scholars have sought
to explain regulatory change in terms of transnational or transgovern-
mental networks of experts (Baker, 2009; Haas, 1992; Mosley, 2009). Con-
trary to organized interest explanations, approaches in this tradition
stress the political influence of the financial epistemic communities that
hold highly specialized knowledge. Past literature has shown that gov-
ernments are largely dependent on the expertise of self-regulatory inter-
national bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basle
Committee, whose membership consists largely of private industry asso-
ciations (Underhill and Zhang, 2010). In a similar vein, Tsingou (2010)
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describes how the private sector has been actively influencing financial
policy-making through a ‘coherent transnational policy community’.
This explanation highlights the transnational nature of informal gover-
nance networks such as the ‘Group of 30’, whose membership blurs the
public-private distinction by including supervisors, regulators and repre-
sentatives of business associations. She argues that ‘the financial industry
is now organized [. . .] in a way that is qualitatively different from interest
groups’ (Tsingou, 2010: 23). Indeed, financial governance today relies on
a combination of rule-setting and implementing by both the private and
the public sectors (Mosley, 2009).
Yet, if the transnational community of financial experts caused the shift
towards consumer protection, one would expect to see a degree of con-
sensus among the financial elite on a set of reform provisions, ‘for with-
out a clear mission and rationale experts are unlikely to influence policy’
(Finnemore, 1996: 99). However, the global financial and economic crisis
called the expertise of the existing financial epistemic community and
their past consensus on light-touch regulation into question. In the after-
math of the crisis, the financial community was divided over the desir-
ability of reform. Divisions emerged among politicians, regulators and
industry representatives as well as between parts of the private financial
sector, thereby reducing the sector’s post-crisis political influence
(Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011; Engelen, 2011). After the damage the finan-
cial crisis had done to the economy and linkages between the financial
industry and the political system became publicly denounced, this trans-
national community of experts partly lost its political leverage.
Electoral politics
Another plausible hypothesis would hold that electoral contingencies
and public opinion are a causal factor influencing decision-makers. This
explanation is clearly perceptible for several of the Dodd-Frank meas-
ures, such as a tougher derivative regulation due to Senator Blanche
Lincoln’s position in response to an electoral challenge or the dilution of
the ‘Volcker Rule’ wording after the election of Republican Scott Brown
(Woolley and Ziegler, 2011). Polling data gives us clues to about why the
topic was very popular with decision-makers in general, with 57 per cent
of those polled supporting the creation of a new federal agency to protect
consumers (Limbach, 2009). It should have been clear to decision-makers
that there was very little appetite among voters for a soft line on the
industry. Hence, in the US case, electoral politics cannot be denied as a
factor in the increased focus on consumer issues in financial reforms. In
Europe, however, electoral contingencies cannot account for why the
technocrats of the European Commission put the issue at the forefront of
their reform proposals. After all, 85 per cent of Europeans reported that
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they have never had a problem with a financial product or service
(European Commission, 2012).
An alternative explanation: a civil society perspective
Given the public outcry and emerging popular pressures in response to
the latest financial crisis, recent efforts on the part of scholars to explain
regulatory changes pay strikingly limited attention to the role of TCS
such as transnational consumer associations, trade unions and grass-
roots organizations. Woolley and Ziegler (2011: 4) argue that the Dodd-
Frank Act is the result of a ‘creative brokering of elites and grass roots
interests’. While elected officials in Washington tried to cultivate friendly
relations with Wall Street, they also tried to appeal to popular activists.
Indeed, the involvement of these societal actors in the financial reform
debate was one of the most striking aspects of the crisis. Despite the
growing consensus in the literature that transnational actors play an
active part in world politics (Josseline and Wallace, 2001), research exam-
ining the links between these emerging actors and global finance in par-
ticular is relatively young. In the field of global economic policy, civil
society activism has been described as ‘economic justice movements’ or
‘anti-globalization movements’ (Clark, 2006: 180). O’Brien et al. (2000),
for example, found increased engagement on the part of civil society in
multilateral economic institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These developments marked a shift
away from the state-focused ‘international relations’ theory to the study
of the ‘global society,’ which recognizes the increased role of non-state
actors in global policy (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008). Accordingly, scholars
started to pay more attention to civil society as an alternative source for
regulation and an increasingly important actor in standard-setting pro-
cesses of regulation, especially in the EU (Dunkerley and Fudge, 2004).
Some scholars have recognized the various social responses to financial
crises, identifying civil society as an emerging actor in financial regula-
tory policies in Europe and the US (Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011; Friesen,
2012; Woolley and Ziegler, 2011). Scholte and Schnabel (2002) attribute
an active role to civil society, but limited impact in shaping regulatory
outcomes. Non-state actors’ impact on financial regulation has yet to be
explored in more detail.
This analysis will therefore put a spotlight on the contribution of weak
and diffuse interests to reforming the international financial regime. The-
ories of regulatory capture do not hold in times of severe crises, when
elected politicians are pressured by public opinion towards enacting
financial reforms ‘even when these run against the preferences of the
domestic financial industry groups’ (Pagliari, 2013: 9). In ‘normal times’
financial regulation is an issue of interest groups politics characterized
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by relatively low public visibility (Woolley, 2012: 61). As a result of the
recent financial crisis, regulatory reform was susceptible to public out-
rage, pushing financial regulatory reform out of the arena of ‘quiet polit-
ics’, where interest group politics are shielded from public debate, into
the arena of ‘noisy politics’, which force elected politicians to react to
popular opinion or interest groups representing it (Culpepper, 2011;
Woll, 2012). As Culpepper (2011: 9) notes: ‘Unexpected events can tem-
porarily raise the salience of an issue, thus creating a policy window for
would-be entrepreneurs and a more level-playing field [. . .]’. Meins
(2000) argues that by redistributing political leverage from producers to
consumers, public outrage helps pressure groups such as consumer asso-
ciations to overcome the collective action problem that is inherently
linked to groups’ efforts at providing a public good, i.e. consumer protec-
tion. Illustrating the critical role of ‘demonstration effects’ as triggers of
regulatory reforms, which demonstrate to a wider public the costs of cap-
ture and create a demand for reform, this article underlines the cataclys-
mic effects of the crisis (Mattli and Woods, 2009: 26).
In order to understand regulatory change, this paper adopts the analyt-
ical framework proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) in their analysis of
conditions under which transnational networks can stimulate change. In
doing so, I trace the rise of consumer protection back to activism by a civil
society network,2 which encompasses the range of transnational non-
state actors who are committed to reforming financial regulation in the
interest of the broader public – that is, in the interest of consumers of
financial services. Such civil society groups include a wide range of
organizations, from consumer associations, think tanks and policy
research institutes to trade unions, business associations and other
NGOs.
The evidence presented in the empirical section of this paper suggests
that by exploiting widespread public and media attention and a strong
pro-reform citizen base, NGOs, consumer associations and trade unions
established transnational networks among themselves which strength-
ened their capacity to call upon far more powerful allies, so-called ‘target
actors’ that can influence policy-making directly (‘leverage politics’).
NGOs and consumer groups engaged in ‘direct lobbying’ in order to
influence the agenda-setting process – which was successful because TCS
not only ‘framed’ the reform debate in a way that connected with the
wider public and decision-makers alike but also gathered politically
usable information. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 22) coin the phrase ‘symbolic
politics’ to describe a strategy to create awareness, by providing an inter-
pretation for such an event. ‘Information politics’ refers to the capability
of TCS networks to gain influence by generating politically usable infor-
mation and serving as an alternate source of expertise. Finally, through a
variation of ‘boomerang politics,’ activists were able to generate
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additional effective political pressure on states through other channels,
such as international organizations whose decisions would echo back
into national politics (Friesen, 2012). As we will see in the case studies, a
combination of these strategies proved to be particularly effective in rais-
ing consumer concerns.
2. EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS: THE EMERGENCE
OF FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
In Europe and the US alike, policy-makers reacted to the crisis and recog-
nized the importance of financial consumer protection (see Table 1 for a
detailed comparison). I will consider the two cases in turn in order to
explain what accounts for this convergence. Due to their market power,
both are central actors in financial market regulations with consequences
Table 1 Consumer-friendly regulation post-crisis: Cross-Atlantic comparison
European Commission
proposals US Dodd-Frank Act
Investor Compensation Commission proposal to
amend Directive 97/9/
EC on investor-
compensation schemes
(12.07.2010)
The Act provides new
rules for transparency
and accountability to
protect investors and
businesses
Deposit Guarantees Commission proposal for a
revision of the Directive
on deposit guarantee
schemes (12.07.2010)
The Act permanently
increases deposit
insurance for banks,
thrifts and credit unions
to $250,000
Mortgage Lending Commission proposal for a
Directive on credit
agreements relating to
residential property
(31.03.2011) to improve
the way in which
mortgages are sold to
consumers
In January 2013, the CFPB
laid out new mortgage
rules prohibits interalia.
deceptive teaser rates
Financial Inclusion EU adopts Commission
Recommendation on
access to a basic
payment account
(18.07.2011)
The Act authorizes CFPB
to improve access to
mainstream financial
institutions
Retail Investment
Products (PRIPs)
Commission proposal for a
regulation on a new Key
Information Document
for investment products
(03.07.2012)
CFPB oversight of bank
and nonbank providers
of retail investment
expected
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for the rest of the world. Focusing on cases where consumer protection
became a prominent feature of regulatory reforms (‘case selection on the
dependent variable’) allows us to test hypotheses by means of eliminat-
ing rival explanations for the phenomenon of interest. More specifically,
comparing the two cases with a common outcome and very different
political structures will allow us to identify the dynamics of civil society
activism as a common factor that can explain the regulatory reform
outcome.
The US case
The US administration set an ambitious post-crisis reform program in
motion. For the first time, Dodd-Frank created the CFPB (Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau) – an independent regulatory agency,
housed in the Federal Reserve, with the sole responsibility of protecting
consumers of financial products. In charging one single agency with con-
sumer protection responsibilities, the reform succeeded in replacing a
patchwork of seven different agencies, thereby consolidating and
strengthening the regulation of consumer financial products. The new
bureau also hosts a national consumer complaint hotline as well as a new
Office of Financial Education to promote financial literacy. Most impor-
tantly, the CFPB conducts rule-making, supervision and enforcement for
federal consumer financial protection laws; it monitors financial markets
and can enforce laws that outlaw discrimination and other unfair treat-
ment in consumer finance. Consumer groups have widely acknowledged
the CFPB as a powerful new regulator: ‘It is the first federal regulator
that not only has the ability to write rules for non-banks, but it also has
the ability to supervise and examine non-banks. That’s a power that has
never accrued to any federal bureau before’, summarizes a consumer
representative.3 At the 2010 conference of the American Council on Con-
sumer Interests Ed Mierzwinski (2010, 596), consumer advocate at the US
PIRG, celebrated the bureau as a huge victory for the consumer move-
ment: ‘Over the past year, the traditional consumer movement aligned
itself with civil rights, labor, senior and other groups faced off against a
phalanx of powerful special interests hell-bent on beating our big idea
that consumers deserved an independent agency. . ..They lost. We won.’
The initial idea for a consumer protection agency had come from Har-
vard law professor and consumer advocate Elisabeth Warren, who had
published articles in 2007 and 2008 arguing in favour of a Financial Prod-
uct Safety Commission. In March 2009, two years after Warren’s first arti-
cle was published and in the midst of the turmoil caused by the financial
crisis, two Congressmen picked up the idea and formally introduced it
into Congress. The President himself as well as Treasury Secretary Barr
became advocates of the idea, and later that year, in June 2009, the
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Treasury included the proposal of a new agency in its White Paper
‘Financial regulatory reform: A new foundation’ which served as a blue-
print for financial reform. Warren’s proposal enjoyed widespread sup-
port by liberals (Woolley and Ziegler, 2011:41). She was also the
candidate of choice of a group called ‘Americans for Financial Reform’
(AFR), a coalition of 250 consumer, housing and labour groups, which
made passing the CFPB its top legislative priority.
The fact that the CFPB came into being was a ‘remarkable event’
(Woolley and Ziegler, 2011) given the strong opposition from industry
groups, who reportedly increased their lobbying efforts. According to
the Center for Responsive Politics (2010), industry mobilized and spent
$224.6 million on lobbying in 2009, more than any other sector (except for
the health sector which spent $263.6 million during the same time
period). Arguably, the new consumer bureau attracted more hostility
from industry groups than any other reform proposal. Warren herself
said that the industry’s aim was to ‘to stick a knife in the ribs’ of the new
bureau (Interview with Jon Stewart 2011). In September 2009, right after
Senator Dodd had introduced a version of the bill in the House in July, a
group of 25 business associations, including the US Chamber of Com-
merce and the Financial Services Roundtable, sent a letter to members of
the House opposing ‘the drastic powers granted to a new agency [. . .]
will impose severe unintended consequences on businesses and consum-
ers alike,’ the groups wrote (US Chamber of Commerce, 2009). In a testi-
mony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Edward Yingling,
president of the American Bankers Association (ABA) complained that
the CFPB would undermine innovation, limit consumer choice, and com-
plicate existing regulatory structures. ‘Simply put, this would appear to
be the most powerful agency ever created in that it has almost unlimited
power to regulate and even mandate the products offered by the regu-
lated’, (Yingling, 2009).
As a result, several consumer protection provisions did not make it
into the final bill or were ‘significantly watered down’ (Carpenter, 2010:
828). For instance, a provision for so-called ‘plain vanilla’ products, fav-
oured among consumer groups, was completely eliminated. Auto dealers
are also exempted from oversight by the CFPB, another example of how a
consumer-friendly proposal did not make it into the Dodd-Frank Act,
despite lobbying by the AFR coalition which had actively tried to block
exemptions from CFPB oversight. Even though civil society had thrown
all its weight behind Warren to become head of the new agency, Presi-
dent Obama eventually nominated Richard Cordray as the first director
of the bureau, following strong Republican and industry opposition to
Warren’s appointment.
Despite the fact that massive industry lobbying had successfully
slowed down the implementation process of US financial regulatory
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reform –with 60% of Dodd-Frank’s rules not being in place by 1 July 2013 –
the creation of the CFPB is a unique win for consumer advocates. In
accordance with activists’ wishes the new bureau has market-wider cover-
age, a single director, its funds are not subject to the congressional appro-
priations process and it has significant authority on rules supervision and
enforcement over banks and non-banks. As one activist put it: ‘Compared
to a world where we could not make a single advance on consumer regula-
tion for decades this is a big change’.4
The EU case
Similarly to the US reaction to the crisis, the European Union (EU) agreed
on a series of reform proposals that significantly altered the regulatory
architecture of European financial regulation and deepened the single
market in financial services. Although there is no overarching initiative
in the EU that would be comparable to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commis-
sion brought forward several legislative proposals, some of which, at the
time of this writing, are being discussed in the European Parliament (EP)
and the Council. In October 2008, as a first step in response to the finan-
cial crisis, Commission President JoseBarroso appointed a high level
group of financial services experts to lay out the foundations for reform
of the European financial system architecture.
The Larosiere Report, issued in February 2009, was the first EU-level
document that gave a comprehensive account of required structural
changes. Based on that report, the EP – following agreement by all the
member states – voted through a new supervisory framework for finan-
cial regulation in the EU on 22 September 2010; it came into force in
January 2011. Within the new framework, consumer protection falls
within the jurisdiction of the three new European Supervisory Authori-
ties (ESAs) that work in tandem with the existing national supervisory
authorities. Although not quite comparable to the American CFPB, the
ESAs have a mandate to protect consumers against abusive practices,
with stakeholder groups representing consumer associations in all three
organizations. The European Securities and Markets Authority, for
instance, issues reports on consumer trends as well as warnings, and it
monitors new financial activities as well as the development of common
rules on information transparency. After the financial crisis, the Euro-
pean Commission markedly stepped up its rhetoric on increasing con-
sumer protection in retail financial services. Commissioner Barnier
became a strong entrepreneur in favour of enhanced consumer protec-
tion, and he emphasized this point with respect to the new authorities
when he asserted: ‘These measures will enhance consumer protection.
And they will contribute to ensuring the taxpayer is not again the first in
line to bear the costs of a crisis’ (Barnier, 2011).
KASTNER: ‘MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?’
1325
 
In addition to this institutional change, Barnier has been promoting an
extensive legislative agenda with financial reform documents issued by
the Commission oftentimes putting emphasis on consumer protection.
Under the headline of ‘A more consumer-friendly financial system’, the
DG for Internal Market and Services (2010) listed several provisions for
enhancing consumer welfare through a standardized information sheet
(‘ESIS’) to compare mortgage conditions from different providers, grant-
ing access to basic bank accounts and better investor protection. The
Commission tabled proposals on deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) and
investor compensation schemes (ICS) together as a ‘package to boost con-
sumer protection and confidence in financial services’ (EC, 2010a).
Further reforms deal with stricter regulations of retail investment
products with the Commission proposal from July 2012 envisaging better
protection for retail investors through a simplified information sheet as
well as a debate on a stricter regulation of benefits that investment firms
receive from a third party (‘inducements’), as suggested in the proposal
for a Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) in October
2011. In September 2013 the EP adopted a Mortgage Credit Directive
highlighting the ‘high level of consumer protection in the area of credit
agreements related to residential property’ (EP, 2013). This push towards
more consumer oriented policies was clearly felt by the mortgage indus-
try, as one interviewee described: ‘The crisis arrived and the Commission
felt the need to respond to show that it was doing something . . . the num-
ber one focus had to be putting European consumers at the heart of pol-
icy making. As an industry . . . we certainly didn’t agree with this switch
or perhaps not in the way it happened.’5
As in the American case, the regulatory changes attracted pressure
from business groups against certain reform proposals. The EP and the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs reportedly faced
‘extremely vigorous’ lobbying pressure from financial service-sector lob-
byists (Hoedeman, 2009). However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the lob-
bying environment had drastically changed for industry representatives,
with bureaucrats and members of the European Parliament(MEPs) giv-
ing industry lobbyists ‘a very tough time’ as one interviewee reported.6
While civil society groups generally take some credit for bringing new
proposals on the agenda, initial reform proposals seem to have been
watered down substantially during the implementation phase. Accord-
ing to a representative of a Brussels-based NGO: ‘We mostly address
level 1 legislation but there is also level 2, the implementation. The battle
seems to be on level 1, but it is lost on level 2. That is where financial
industry lobbyists play a role. Often measures remain empty. In the end
it is a question of resources.’7
Talking about the political influence of the financial industry through
lobbying power in the EU, another representative from a Brussels-based
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NGO stated that everything was ‘back to business as usual.’ And when
asked about the improvements brought about by the EU financial
reforms, another NGO representative remarked that he was rather pessi-
mistic about the reforms’ long-term benefits for consumers.8 Moreover,
NGOs denounced the new ESAs for placing too little importance on con-
sumer protection in their mandate as well as for their member composi-
tion, which favours a strong presence of big banks.9 On the issue of the
European standardized information sheet, one NGO representative com-
plained that the Commission consulted only four consumer organiza-
tions but 20 business organizations: ‘It is about pleasing the business and
keeping NGOs quiet.’10 Hence, while the Commission’s rhetoric left little
doubt about the importance of making the financial system more con-
sumer-friendly, consumer representatives remain sceptical about reform
process as well as substance.
The international level
While financial regulatory policy is usually negotiated by regulators and
private actors, the G20 has become a major player in financial reform
debates and hence a crucial target for civil society campaigns. Consumers
International (CI), the world federation of consumer groups, mobilized
its 240 members to lobby the G20 meetings for example in the run-up to
the Seoul Summit in November 2010, in close cooperation with the big-
gest European and American consumer associations.
BEUC, the US Consumers Union (CU) and CI launched the
‘Consumers for Fair Financial Services’ campaign, calling for the G20 to
take urgent action to support financial consumer protection and develop
new international guidelines. At the time, the campaign group had
already been working on concrete propositions that were later released
as ‘recommendations for the G20 on the enhancement of consumer pro-
tection in financial services,’ in-cluding a call for international standards
and guidelines as well as development of an international organization
to share best practices and support the development of standards and
guidelines. Following the CI campaign, and in response to a call by the
G20 in February 2011, an OECD-led Task Force produced ‘High-level
Principles on Financial Consumer Protection,’ which the G20 finance
ministers endorsed in October of the same year. The final document calls
on all G20 members to ‘assess their national frameworks for financial
consumer protection in the light of these principles and promote interna-
tional co-operation to support the strengthening of financial consumer
protection in line with, and building upon, the principles’ (OECD, 2011).
For the first time, decision-makers agreed on international (non-binding)
standards to enhance financial consumer protection across all financial
service sectors.
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To sum up, two observations are worth underlining.
First, despite intense lobbying efforts by the financial industry, con-
sumer concerns became one of the key domains of official reform agen-
das. Neither in Europe nor in the US was the financial industry
successful in terms of blocking a more consumer-friendly re-regulation
of international finance. On the contrary, the creation of a watchdog for
consumer financial products was a clear defeat for industry groups. Most
industry groups had not supported cross-sectorial international princi-
ples on financial consumer protection. These observations run counter to
the capture narratives.
Second, while the initial reform agenda on both sides of the Atlantic
seemed to mark a clear consumer-friendly turn in financial services, the
subsequent reform and implementation process was not nearly as pro-
nounced as pro-change advocates had wished for. How can we explain
the political processes that led to the initial ambitious reform agenda as
well as its subsequent dilution during implementation?
3. THE TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORK
The subprime crisis also turned out to be a major catalyst for the forma-
tion of a broad inter-regional alliance among consumer associations,
trade unions, NGOs and anti-globalization activists, allowing civil soci-
ety to strengthen its capacity to influence the policy process. Groups that
had never been involved in finance before reported that they started their
work on financial issues after the crisis. Others stepped up their activities
and built new coalitions that had not existed prior to the crisis.11 While
hundreds of groups have been engaged, the main focus here will be on
the most visible umbrella organizations in the reform debates. Table 2
tries to capture the most relevant organizations.
A new AFR alliance of more than 250 civil society organizations was
announced in May 2009, at about the same time the US administration
brought forward its reform proposals. The formation of such an alliance
in the financial services sector, representing ‘a cohesive non-industry
voice’, was a unique event in American history (Woolley and Ziegler,
2011: 23). The ‘big tent’ coalition included labour unions, civil rights
groups, state organizations, consumer associations and small businesses.
One coalition member reported: ‘No organization could have done
Dodd-Frank all by itself. We realized the more people would join in the
easier it would be to divide up the work.’.12 With consumer protection in
American history mostly driven by class action, organized public interest
groups could react immediately when the crisis hit – with the National
Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) filing an official discrimina-
tion complaint against Standard and Poor’s in January 2009. Reflecting
the fact that consumer activism is ‘inextricably intertwined with the civil
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
1328
 
T
a
b
le
2
C
iv
il
so
ci
et
y
en
g
ag
ed
in
re
fo
rm
in
g
co
n
su
m
er
fi
n
an
ci
al
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
20
08
–
20
13
N
am
e
F
ou
n
de
d
N
u
m
be
r
of
m
em
be
rs
N
u
m
be
r
of
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
T
yp
e
of
or
ga
n
iz
at
io
n
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l/
tr
a
n
sa
tl
a
n
ti
c
C
I
19
60
22
0
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
11
5
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
fe
d
er
at
io
n
o
f
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
T
A
C
D
19
98
77
E
U
/
U
S
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s

22
F
o
ru
m
o
f
E
U
/
U
S
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
E
U
A
L
T
E
R
-E
U

16
0
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
ra
n
g
in
g
fr
o
m
N
G
O
s
to
tr
ad
e
u
n
io
n
s
C
o
al
it
io
n
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
in
te
re
st
g
ro
u
p
s
an
d
tr
ad
e
u
n
io
n
s
B
E
U
C
19
62
44
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
31
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
n
o
n
p
ro
fi
t
E
U
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
E
F
F
R
20
09
18
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
ra
n
g
in
g
fr
o
m
N
G
O
s
to
tr
ad
e
u
n
io
n
s

36
C
o
al
it
io
n
to
ca
m
p
ai
g
n
fo
r
fi
n
an
ci
al
re
fo
rm
E
T
U
C
19
73
83
tr
ad
e
u
n
io
n
s
36
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
n
o
n
p
ro
fi
t
E
U
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
E
u
ro
in
v
es
to
rs
20
09
-

10
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
fe
d
er
at
io
n
o
f
in
v
es
to
rs
an
d
o
th
er
en
d
u
se
rs
F
IN
-U
S
E
20
04
15
ex
p
er
t
g
ro
u
p
s
o
n
u
se
rs
o
f
fi
n
an
ci
al
se
rv
ic
es
15
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
ex
p
er
t
fo
ru
m
in
cl
u
d
in
g
ac
ad
em
ic
s,
sm
al
l
b
u
si
n
es
s
ex
p
er
ts
,c
o
n
su
m
er
g
ro
u
p
s
S
o
li
d
ar
19
48
56
m
em
b
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
25
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
n
et
w
o
rk
o
f
N
G
O
s
U
S
A
F
R
20
09
25
0
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
ra
n
g
in
g
fr
o
m
co
n
su
m
er
N
G
O
s
to
sm
al
l
b
u
si
n
es
se
s
U
S
C
o
al
it
io
n
to
ca
m
p
ai
g
n
fo
r
fi
n
an
ci
al
re
fo
rm
C
F
A
19
68
30
0
n
o
n
-p
ro
fi
t
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
U
S
A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
o
f
n
o
n
-p
ro
fi
t
co
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
to
ad
v
an
ce
th
e
co
n
su
m
er
in
te
re
st
C
U
19
36
8
m
il
li
o
n
su
b
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
s
to
n
ew
sl
et
te
rs
U
S
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t,
n
o
n
p
ro
fi
t
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
N
A
C
A
-
15
00
at
to
rn
ey
s
U
S
N
o
n
-p
ro
fi
t
as
so
ci
at
io
n
o
f
at
to
rn
ey
s
an
d
co
n
su
m
er
ad
v
o
ca
te
s
N
C
L
18
99
-
U
S
C
o
n
su
m
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
N
C
R
C
19
90
60
0
m
em
b
er
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
U
S
A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
th
at
p
ro
m
o
te
s
ac
ce
ss
to
b
as
ic
b
an
k
in
g
se
rv
ic
es
P
C
19
71
80
,0
00
m
em
b
er
s
U
S
C
o
n
su
m
er
ri
g
h
ts
g
ro
u
p
,n
o
n
p
ro
fi
t
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
U
S
P
IR
G
19
70
26
st
at
e
P
IR
G
S
U
S
F
ed
er
at
io
n
o
f
st
at
e
P
u
b
li
c
In
te
re
st
R
es
ea
rc
h
G
ro
u
p
s
S
ou
rc
e:
A
ss
em
b
le
d
b
y
th
e
au
th
o
r
KASTNER: ‘MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?’
1329
 
rights struggle’ in the US (Cohen, 2010: 237) the AFR argued that
‘systemic racial and ethnic discrimination was (. . .) a significant underly-
ing cause’ of the current financial crisis’ and called the creation of the
CFPB ‘an important step forward in protecting’ civil rights (Zirkin, 2009).
Although civil society groups had well-established connections among
each other, in spring 2009 the relations were formalized under the AFR
umbrella and regular meetings of task force subgroups started to take
place. Cohen (2010: 235) refers to the ‘fourth wave of consumer activism’.
In the European case, the absence of rights activism explains why there
was less grass-roots activism post-crisis. Only a few European initiatives
on consumer protection existed prior to the crisis – such as Udo Reifner’s
European Coalition for Responsible Credit. Modelling themselves after
the American initiative, the coalition ‘Europeans for Financial Reform’
(EFFR) was created in September 2009 by 23 different groups represent-
ing several hundred European organizations, ranging from development
NGOs and trade unions to the European Socialist Party. The President of
the Party of European Socialists Rasmussen together with the leftist think
tank the Global Progressive Forum played a leading role in organizing
the campaign. Contrary to AFR, which was a coalition made up exclu-
sively of civil society groups, the Party of European Socialists (PES) and
the Greens organized the EFFR campaign in tandem with trade unions
and NGOs. A number of meetings among members of the two pro-
reform groups took place in Washington, DC, New York and Brussels
between 2009 and 2010,13 allowing the groups to build transatlantic con-
nections. The groups created the new position of a ‘Project Officer for
Financial Reform’ in Brussels to coordinate the campaign.14 Both cam-
paign groups were part of a rapidly expanding transnational network of
organizations and individuals that became actively involved in the
reform debate.
Leverage politics and public entrepreneurs
Civil society groups leveraged upon powerful allies, so-called ‘target
actors’ who can influence policy-making directly. Annual meetings of the
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), for example, were an impor-
tant forum for information sharing. One representative remarked: ‘At
these meetings high level political representatives are present, [Commis-
sioner] Barnier for example. So it is an opportunity to put forward com-
mon recommendations and build a momentum.’15 Another important
stakeholder meeting was the Financial Forum in Ljubljana in May 2010.
Consumer groups interpreted the Conference as ‘a milestone to raise the
issue of consumer protection on the political level, to make the link
between work at the national level and at the international front,’ as one
NGO member put it.16 Also, campaigns organized after the meeting
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drew heavily on the common principles laid down in Ljubljana. Hence,
these conferences served networking purposes in two respects: first, civil
society could use them as a platform to find common ground in order to
speak with a cohesive voice. Second, the groups could use the forums to
convince ‘target actors’ of their agendas.
Soon after the crisis, and in contrast to the US case, civil society in
Europe found a powerful political ally in the EP. Moreover, in an effort
to create an environment favourable to civil society input, MEP Pascal
Canfin (Green Party) initiated the creation of an NGO named ‘Finance-
Watch’ in 2009 as a counter-lobby to the financial industry. Not least,
the new NGO serves as an example of MEPs as public entrepreneurs
who have built a strong pro-reform alliance with civil society. Not only
MEPs but also the Commission became more receptive to demands for
better consumer protection after the financial crisis and with the change
in leadership at the Commission DG, from McGreevy to Barnier. ‘It
made it as different as day and night,’ said a consumer representative.17
Industry lobbyists struggled to get access to the policy process, as one
interviewee in Brussels reported: ‘Immediately, if you say you are repre-
senting a bank, you are dead. It is not as nice as it was 15 years ago. It
has become more difficult and it has become less transparent than it
was.’18
On both sides of the Atlantic, well-positioned allies played a central
role. In the US, the AFR coalition found a strong political ally in Har-
vard law professor Elizabeth Warren. In her position as Special Advisor
to the Treasury at the CFPB, she was an important public entrepreneur
on the political stage who defended the new consumer agency in con-
gressional hearings and various sub-committee meetings of the House
of Representatives.19 The Obama administration itself became a strong
advocate of consumer protection in the reform process. In his Wall
Street speech in April 2010, the President made clear that he regarded
consumer protection as an essential element of the financial reform,
thereby risking ‘increasingly fractious relations’ with the financial
industry (Cooper, 2010). Had it not been for this support from powerful
entrepreneurs receptive to civil society demands, consumer protection
would most likely not have seen the light of day. Or, as a representa-
tive of an NGO put it, ‘because the President and Elizabeth Warren are
providing Washington with the moral leadership it often lacks, do we
have a chance to enact meaningful Wall Street reform’ (Mierzwinski,
2010: 585).
However, why did public entrepreneurs listen this time to civil society
calls that had been issued long before the crisis? In the following section,
I will argue that this was due to fierce lobbying efforts combined with the
use of a dominant rhetoric that resonated well with the wider public and
decision-makers in the aftermath of the crisis.
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Direct lobbying
Civil society promoted the issue of consumer protection early on in the
reform process and sought to impact the political agenda through direct
lobbying to influence powerful actors. In the US, civil society picked up
Warren’s idea and put its weight behind it. One of the first actions was
the release of a joint statement by the leaders of seven of the country’s
leading public-interest groups in December 2008, giving clear instruc-
tions for the reinstatement of an Office of Consumer Affairs in the White
House, about one year before the idea was formally introduced into Con-
gress (CU, 2008). The reform agenda was then sent to President-elect Bar-
ack Obama and strongly supported by 12 members of the AFR coalition
in testimony before the US House of Representatives and the Senate in
several hearings between June and September 2009 (Kirsch and Mayer,
2013: 74). On behalf of the AFR coalition Ed Mierzwinski of US PIRG and
Travis Plunkett (2009) of the Consumer Federation of America testified in
June 2009 before the Financial Services House Committee that a ‘robust,
independent, federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency’ was
needed to address the ‘failure of federal regulators to stop abusive lend-
ing’. All witnesses representing AFR agreed that the CFPB would effec-
tively respond to the underlying causes of the crisis. Counterarguments
from the industry side mostly focused on the negative impact of the
CFPB on small business. David Hirschman (2009) speaking at the House
Committee for the US Chamber of Commerce in September 2009 con-
cluded that ‘the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency would
result in reduced access to credit for small businesses’. ABA’s Ed Yin-
gling (2009) claimed that the CFPB would disproportionately burden
small banks and credit unions. Despite the industry opposition the bill
passed the House on 11 December 2009 in a 223 to 202 vote, with all but
three Republicans in opposition.
Most European civil society groups also stepped up their lobbying
efforts on reforms in Brussels after the Larosiere High Level Group pub-
lished its report in February 2009, which they criticized for a lack of focus
on consumer protection. In various letters to Commission President
Barroso, FIN-USE (2009b) denounced a ‘lack of direct public interest rep-
resentation’. The European Consumers’ Organization BEUC (2009) also
put pressure on the Commission, saying that the communication on
‘European Financial Supervision’ was leaving out the conduct-of-
business side. The EFFR (2009) coalition joined these calls, saying that the
EU needed ‘a financial system at the service of people’s interests’. The
groups continued to draw up several drafts and published position
papers as well as responses to Commission consultations. A closer look
at the Commission’s roadmap to enhance consumer protection in EU
financial system reform (DG Internal Market and Services, 2010) reveals
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that all four key measures to enhance consumer protection had appeared
earlier in the position papers published by BEUC and FIN-USE.20 More-
over, the Commission’s roadmap recognized that ‘consumers and other
end-users of financial services need to be closely involved in and con-
sulted on policy developments’ in financial markets, thereby addressing
the demand for fairer interest representation (FIN-USE, 2009a). Finally,
TACD members had been lobbying intensively to get consumer protec-
tion into the mandate of the three authorities. The European Green Party
strongly supported civil society efforts, and several MEPs called for a
strong consumer protection mandate for the new institutions.21 Civil
action also included organizing projects, press conferences, demonstra-
tions and petitions.
Industry groups were mostly concerned about the shift of responsibil-
ity from the borrower to the lender. This shift became evident, for
instance, in the Commission’s proposal for a mortgage credit Directive
from March 2011 which planned EU-wide legislation that demanded
lenders do stricter creditworthiness assessments, including a duty to
deny credit in case of a negative assessment. Industry lobbyists watered
the provision down to a ‘qualified test’ rather than a strict prohibition in
the final text that was provisionally approved by the EP in September
2013. ‘We brought this shift back to the middle I would say’, a bank lob-
byist reported satisfied.22 These findings suggest that a network of civil
society groups was a primary mover in generating concern about con-
sumer protection in financial services while industry groups successfully
lobbied the legislative process to water down the initial reform proposal.
A closer look at how civil society framed the reform debate will help us
understand why their lobbying efforts nevertheless ended up influencing
initial reform agendas after the crisis.
Symbolic politics
The financial crisis that preceded the reform debate provided a symbolic
event, which in turn became a catalyst for policy change. The crisis had
generated a situation of uncertainty, and as a result of the shaken confi-
dence in traditional sources of expertise, policy-makers turned to civil soci-
ety as new source of advice as well as moral authority. When they advised
policy-makers, civil society actors were careful to frame the issue in a way
that linked unfair consumer practices to the collapse of the economy.23
The argument that a lack of consumer protection led to the financial
crisis and that greater consumer protection must be a reform priority was
reoccurring in documents issued by members of civil society early on in
the reform debate. On several occasions, the CU together with other
groups clearly marked a lack of consumer protection as a root cause of
the crisis – for example, in a testimony to the US House of
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Representatives: ‘The current crisis illustrates the high costs of a failure to
provide effective consumer protection [. . .]’ (CU, 2009). AFR members
(2009) testified that ‘the current crisis occurred (. . .) primarily because the
consumer protection laws that we do have were not always enforced’. As
Kirsch and Mayer (2013: 74) observe consumer activism at Congressional
hearings: ‘One (goal) was to lay out a convincing narrative about the
causes of the mortgage meltdown . . . to show that creating a consumer
financial protection agency was the right policy response.’ Similarly, for
most European consumer associations and pro-reform groups, the link-
age between financial crisis and consumer protection became official
rhetoric and campaign strategy.24 In a document published for an EU
High Level Conference, FIN-USE (2009a) identified a ‘lack of consumer
voice and representation’ as one of the causes of the crisis. The TACD
(2009b) stated: ‘If our governments had provided effective consumer pro-
tections [. . .], much of our current economic disaster could have been
averted.’ CI also based its G20 campaign on the premise that weak finan-
cial consumer protection had caused the crisis.
The same rhetoric used by civil society was then also used by adminis-
trations in Europe and the US. A document released in 2010 by the US
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2010) identi-
fied ‘across-the-board failure to protect consumers’ as one of the root
causes of the financial crisis. One can find similar wording in documents
issued by the DG Internal Market and Services (2010: 5), basing the neces-
sity for reform on the premise that financial regulations ‘often disre-
garded consumer interests.’ Both of these explanations, by the Senate
Committee and by the Commission, testify to the role of civil society as
an issue generator and provide evidence that civil society succeeded in
influencing the discursive position of the US government and the Euro-
pean Commission. The crisis had opened up a policy window for con-
sumer demands, as a representative of an US consumer group put it:
‘Consumer groups had been talking to the Federal Reserve about mort-
gage problems and subprime-lending for 10 years and the Federal
Reserve did nothing until the crash came. . .then politics was right.’25
However, for leverage and symbolic politics to be successful, another
essential partner for civil society which had to be mobilized via broad
media publicity was the wider public. The following section will provide
evidence as to how consumer groups could ‘generate information and
place it where it has most influence’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 16).
Information politics
In the cases at hand, the transnational network tried to disseminate infor-
mation such as statistics, reports or press releases to bring the issue of
consumer protection onto the political agenda. The dominant tactic was
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to discredit the financial industry as a source of expertise by holding the
industry’s behavior up to public scrutiny, what Drinan (2011) calls the
‘mobilization of shame’.
Several NGOs started to systematically review the asymmetry of inter-
est representation among industry and consumers in the policy process;
as a result, numerous studies appeared which would eventually become
news in major newspapers. The New York Times (2010) cited a report pub-
lished by the Center for Responsive Politics showing that the financial
sector’s spending on lobbying since January 2009 mounted up to $600 bil-
lion. CNN Money released an article citing PIRG’s statistics as well as a
Public Citizen’s report about financial institutions hiring some 1000 lob-
byists since 2009 (Liberto, 2010). In addition, in 2009, the non-profit Wall
Street Watch project attracted public attention with a critical report on
the financial sector’s political influence called ‘Sold Out’. The non-profit
public broadcasting service PBS portrayed a similar message in a docu-
mentary it released called ‘The Warning,’ which was but one of a whole
series on industry malpractices that PBS showed throughout 2009. Strong
opposition to the CFPB came from the business lobby including ABA, the
US Chamber of Commerce and the Mortgage Bankers Association. The
Chamber of Commerce announced in September 2009, an advertising
campaign of at least $2 million aimed at defeating the new bureau. News-
paper ads showed a butcher with the line: ‘Virtually every business that
extends credit to American consumers would be affected – even the local
butcher and the credit he extends to his customers’ (Wall Street Journal,
2009). The US Chamber of Commerce even set up a ‘stoptheCFPA.com’
website.
In Europe, ATTAC launched a YouTube video about malpractices in
the banking sector which was viewed over 100,000 times within less than
a month in 2008. NGOs published a number of reports – for example, on
the one-sided composition of expert groups in favour of the financial
business sector (Haar, 2009) or on the political influence of Goldman
Sachs (Spinwatch, 2011). Engaging in ‘shaming,’ in a publicly appealing
event, Brussels-based NGOs under the leadership of Spinwatch, a group
mainly campaigning for more lobbying transparency, awarded the
‘Worst Lobby Awards’. People across Europe could participate via an
online public vote. In 2010 the award was given to Goldman Sachs and
derivatives lobby group ISDA for their lobbying to promote profits for
the financial industry at the expense of the public interest. The organizers
wanted to ‘send a clear message’ to the Commission, ‘that a major clean-
up of the Brussels lobbying scene is urgently needed’ (Spinwatch, 2010).
In the European case, industry groups relied more on face-to-face lobby-
ing than media strategies, as one lobbyist in Brussels reported: ‘We have
to work more in the shadows. We can’t go outside and market our posi-
tion papers.’26
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In order to generate politically usable information, civil society also
provided stories told by people affected – so-called ‘testimony’ (Keck
and Sikkink, 1998). By dramatizing the issue, NGOs create information
that often has more influence on policy-makers than the advice of techni-
cal experts. The Consumers’ Union’s webpage, for instance, provided a
forum for dialogue among citizens and consumer organizations where
victims of abusive lending practices were invited to share their stories.
US citizens submitted over 1000 stories on problems with credit reports.27
In a similar campaign, the federation of State Public Interest Research
Groups submitted 160 stories to Congress about how the financial melt-
down affected consumers.
This combination of dramatic testimonial information along with tech-
nical and statistical information generated by the various campaigns
together, with personal testimony, publicly discredited the industry. By
focusing their campaigns on the misbehaviour of target actors, NGOs
gained moral leverage over industry and policy-makers, thereby generat-
ing politically usable information. The next section will show that, in
order to achieve their aims, civil society also explicitly targeted interna-
tional conferences.
Boomerang politics
One way for civil society to influence policy-making on the international
level is through coalitions with international organizations or actors, thus
pressuring states ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ (Risse, 2008: 265). CI, for
instance, submitted their demands for better consumer protection to the
UN Conference on the World Financial Crisis that took place in New
York in June 2009, and provided ongoing contributions to the newly set
up UN Commission of Experts on Financial Reforms as well as to the
OECD.28 International consumer associations pursued a variation on
the boomerang mechanism to exert pressure on relevant actors such as
the G20 and other international organizations.
The G20 was an important site of contestation. While during the first
G20 meetings consumer protection had largely been neglected, leaders at
the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 agreed that ‘far more needs to
be done to protect consumers’; in June 2010, at the G20 in Toronto, a key
principle put forth was to ‘encourage a comprehensive approach to con-
sumer protection’. Yet, consumer protection was far from being regarded
as a policy priority. Against this background, CI launched a global
‘Consumers for Fair Financial Services’ campaign. As part of the cam-
paign, 30 groups signed an open letter to the G20 in Seoul in November
2010, calling ‘for the needs of everyday consumers of financial services to
be pushed to the top of the agenda’ (CI, 2010). Various NGOs started to
lobby and even had face-to-face contact with important decision-makers
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during the summer of 2010: for instance, German consumer associations
spent one hour with Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French organiza-
tions met briefly with their finance minister, Christine Lagarde. Both poli-
ticians were very receptive to the consumer groups. The 2011 French G20
presidency had made consumer financial protection one of its priorities,
and so Lagarde was particularly eager to take consumer views into
account.29 Eventually, in November 2010, the G20 published a final dec-
laration of the Seoul Summit, saying that they had agreed to enhance con-
sumer protection – to the astonishment of civil society groups.30 In
February 2011, the G20 Finance Ministers called on an OECD task force
to provide options to enhance financial consumer protection. Initially,
the OECD had no plans to publicly consult with civil society, and so the
French finance minister’s advocacy turned out to be instrumental in spur-
ring a public consultation process that included consumer groups. As
one consumer representative reports about a meeting in December 2010
at the OECD:
That first meeting I had with the [OECD] officials concerned, I just had
a feeling that they didn’t regard us as very significant at all . . . but then,
what happened was very important. I went with our French colleagues
to see Madame Lagarde’s office. Within a couple of days, she wrote to
the Secretary General of the OECD, saying that consumer organizations
had to be involved in the G20 mandate. From that point the OECD
started to take us very seriously indeed.31
The first meeting of the OECD task force took place on 6 April 2011 and
till October of the same year, multiple rounds of consultations followed
before a final version of the draft was agreed upon. CI, which had pub-
lished a detailed 40-page report outlining recommendations to enhance
consumer protection, was invited to address the panel, while at the same
time, industry groups were very slow to react and did not even attend
consultation meetings.32 In October 2011, the OECD published a list of
non-binding cross-sectorial international standards, the ‘High-level Prin-
ciples on Financial Consumer Protection,’ which were subsequently
endorsed by the G20. Members of the task force described the consulta-
tion process as consensual, ‘a collective construction, to which everyone
contributed’33 and celebrated the endorsement as a major improvement.
However, besides the fact that the principles remain non-binding, the
language of the final draft uses relatively weak wording such as ‘where
appropriate,’ ‘voluntary,’ or ‘as appropriate’. Several of the principles
were watered down. The proposal for guarantees on consumer deposits
in banks that had appeared in an early draft was removed. Key factors to
enhance transparency (such as the display of costs, and accurate informa-
tion) were banned from the main text and only appear in footnotes. The
creation of a new international organization to share best practices, an
idea brought forward by CI, was not taken on board. ‘We think that
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sends a message about how banks have lobbied the committee’, noted a
consumer representative. Taken together, and despite substantial
changes that were made to dilute the final draft, the common principles
represent an unprecedented international agreement to enhance con-
sumer financial protection as well as an example of how TCS, in tandem
with powerful policy entrepreneurs, can successfully push for an agenda.
Most of all, in the future, the existence of an international standard will
allow watchdog groups to refer to the G20 commitments made by heads
of governments in order to put pressure on the implementation of these
commitments at the national level.
CONCLUSIONS
In response to the crisis consumer concerns became part of legislative
action in the US and the EU. Not least, decision-makers at the G20 agreed
to international standards to enhance consumer protection on a global
scale. This article argued that a TCS network in alliance with public
elected officials was successful in placing consumer concerns on the
agenda. It is too early to say whether the regulatory overhaul was mainly
‘piggybacked’ with pro-social consumer-protections pushed for by
domestic activists groups (Seabrooke, 2006: 112). It can be said however
that financial lobbyists were at least equally successful in watering-down
large parts of reforms during the passage and implementation phase. As
a result, financial consumer protection reforms across the Atlantic have
not redesigned the regulatory framework – no regulatory ‘paradigm
change’ Hall (1993), has taken place –, but reforms still go beyond busi-
ness as usual.
The puzzle is that this regulatory change largely runs counter to the
interests of the most influential and resourceful actors in financial regula-
tion: the banks and industry associations. This calls Olson’s logic of col-
lective action into question, which departs from the assumptions that
consumers are at a huge disadvantage in the face of well-organized busi-
ness interests. Reform legislation after the crisis diverges from theories
that explain regulatory policy-making by concentrated interest-group
pressure or expert knowledge of transnational epistemic communities.
Indeed, the outcome of financial reforms turns on its head the prevalent
prediction from capture theories: that the regulatory outcome in interna-
tional finance corresponds to the preferences of the private sector. In this
case, policy-makers aligned with civil society to push for a more con-
sumer-friendly agenda. This article identified TCS groups as non-govern-
mental entrepreneurs of regulatory change. Exploiting the momentum of
widespread public support and media attention in the aftermath of the
crisis, civil society became a ‘catalyst for politicizing’ (Price, 1998: 639)
consumer financial protection in international finance. The strong citizen
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base, in turn, allowed civil society to call upon well-positioned public
entrepreneurs, such as parliamentarians, EU bureaucrats and key deci-
sion-makers, to weigh in on reform decisions. By reframing the reform
debate, generating information and placing it strategically on the national
and international level through direct lobbying of key actors and a varia-
tion of boomerang politics, the transnational network took advantage of
the increased political salience of financial regulation and made con-
sumer protection a prominent reform issue for politicians and Eurocrats
alike.
This research makes several important contributions. First and fore-
most, it provides a first detailed description of the actions and campaigns
by members of a civil society network in response to the subprime finan-
cial crisis, showing that a growing number of civil society organizations
have developed capacities to engage in the debate on reforming global
finance. However, the article also highlighted the limitations in TCS
capacity to influence regulatory change. The findings suggest that the
impact of NGO campaigns was largely restricted to the agenda-setting
phase of the reform process. By contrast, the crisis-shaken private finan-
cial sector was back on its feet not long after the financial meltdown,
increasing lobbying efforts and slowly trimming back reform advances,
watering down financial reforms during the passage and the subsequent
implementation phase. As an EU industry representative put it, when
asked about the substance of EU consumer protection reform: ‘In the end
of the day: Much ado about nothing’. This corresponds to Culpepper’s
(2011) argument about the rise of ‘quiet politics’ in financial regulation.
As soon as the interest of the public and the media starts to fade away,
highly organized business interests ‘bounce back’ much more quickly
and capture the policy process through their lobbying capacity and
under much less public scrutiny. Nevertheless, this analysis has provided
evidence that transnational NGOs are increasingly involved in standard-
setting aspects of financial regulation – for instance, being involved in
consultation processes with the OECD. Furthermore, the case studies
confirm the oft-argued thesis among scholars that the perception of a cri-
sis is an important factor in precipitating normative change (Price, 1998).
Normative change might not go as far as to put an end to the logic of
‘financialisation’ (Finlayson, 2009) but the international financial crisis
was important for the reform of consumer protection, as it demonstrated
the dramatic failures of the regulatory system and mobilized public
action and pro-change groups. The crisis, however, was the catalyst, not
the cause of policy change. The agency lies at the advocacy of TCS net-
works that policy-makers aligned with in their search for alternative
sources of expertise and under public pressure.
The article is also a contribution to the debate on how financial regula-
tion has changed post-crisis and the role of non-state actors in the
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ongoing contest over the rules governing the global political economy. To
summarize, international financial regulation, an issue area where TCS
power appears to be relatively ineffective, represents a particularly hard
case for demonstrating the role of TCS in global politics. In doing so, this
article joins a number of studies that show that civil society matters in
global politics: in the field of human rights, security policy or environ-
mental protection. To say it in the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Once you
hear the details of victory it is hard to distinguish it from defeat.’ – We
should therefore not let the finding that industry lobbyists successfully
diluted reforms obscure the fact that civil society activism in reaction to
the crisis provides another important example of the potential of non-
state actors to influence policy outcomes on a global scale. To overlook
the involvement of groupings with weaker interests such as small retail
financial services, consumers and organizations that represent them does
a disservice to understanding the regulatory reform outcome in response
to the crisis.
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NOTES
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2. Although some organizations refer to a ‘consumer movement’ to describe
their actions to influence financial reforms, I prefer the term ‘network’, since
the emphasis here is not on the mobilization of a broader public (as with
movements) but on the way civil society got organized to bring policy change
about. I use the term transnational to highlight the cross-border linkages
among the groups involved.
3. Interview with representative of consumer association, Washington, DC
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4. Interview with consumer activist, Washington, DC (September 2013).
5. Interview with industry lobbyist, Brussels (May 2013).
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8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
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Markets: Putting Financial Users at the Heart of the Financial Market Reform’
(2010).
21. Interview with NGO representative, London (July 2011).
22. Interview with industry lobbyist, Brussels (May 2013).
23. Interview with NGO representative, Brussels (August 2011).
24. Interview with consumer representative, Paris (July 2011).
25. Interview with consumer representative, Washington, DC (Sept. 2013).
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